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I.  Introduction
The aim of this article is to consider the policy 
of the Russian colonial military authority in Central 
Asia toward the local elites of Kirghiz2 in Semirech’e 
at the beginning of the twentieth century and examine 
the latter’s attitudes toward Russian rule. 
The author of this article has examined the 
development of the military invasion and rule of 
Central Asia by the Russian Empire, focusing on 
influential local figures who became “collaborators.” 
More specifically, the author has reviewed the attempt 
of the Russian Empire to establish control over the 
Kirghiz nomads living in the mountains and highland 
areas around the Tian Shan Mountains from the mid-
nineteenth to early twentieth century by considering 
how the Russian Empire managed to position the 
manaps—the tribal chieftain class—and how the 
manaps responded to the military expansion and 
rule of the Russian Empire. To conduct his research, 
the author has undertaken a life-history approach in 
examining a Kirghiz chieftain, concentrating on the 
life of a manap, Shabdan Jantay uulu (1840-1912), 
who experienced the entire period from the Russian 
Empire’s military invasion to their subsequent control 
as a “collaborator” with the Russian rule.
As has been pointed out in preceding articles—
based on the assistance to the Russian military 
expansion into Central Asia, including the khanate 
of Khoqand in 1870s—Shabdan continued to impact 
Russian rule over Kirghiz even after the 1880s, 
remaining influential until the beginning of the 
twentieth century. He was granted the military title 
of Voiskovoi Starshina (Lieutenant Colonel) in 1883. 
However, the important point to note and emphasise is 
that, although Shabdan was a prominent collaborator 
with the Russian Empire, it does not necessarily 
imply that he completely agreed with the Russian 
rule. Although Shabdan himself never rose in revolt 
against the Russian Empire, there were deep rifts and 
conflicts between Shabdan and the Russian Empire. In 
fact, at the beginning of the twentieth century, when 
Semirech’e became the main target of colonization 
by Slavic peasants in Central Asia under the strong 
leadership of the central tsarist government,3 Shabdan 
was faced with a significant land problem and 
succeeded in gaining a special allotment of land from 
the Russian colonial military authority, who feared the 
resistance of local nomads against the expropriation 
of land.4 Nevertheless, in this circumstance, the heart 
of Shabdan ironically tended to deviate from Russia. 
From the end of the nineteenth century, Shabdan 
begun to deepen his involvement with Islam. Indeed, 
he constructed a mosque and conducting hajj, and as a 
result, he was given the new title baatïr hajji by adding 
the new Islamic honorific title, hajji, to the existing 
nomadic one, baatïr, or hero.5 Regarding his Islamic 
involvement, it must not be forgotten that Shabdan 
was engaged in the Muslim modernist movement, 
or Jadidism. Among his sons, Kamal Shabdanov was 
educated at Galie medrese in Ufa and Khisametdin 
Shabdanov established a mederese at his father’s 
mosque and invited Tatar teachers.6 In spite of that, 
Russian colonial military authority could not disregard 
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Shabdan, because it was obliged to rely on him for the 
maintenance of public order among the local society. 
The case of the special land allotment for Shabdan was 
typical, which clearly illustrates the dilemmas faced by 
the Russian colonial military authority. 
Thus, it can be assumed that Shabdan’s death 
had a great impact on the regional order. Death or 
funeral ceremonies have generally been investigated 
from ethnographical and anthropological viewpoints 
to compile information on the traditional customs 
of “primitive” societies. In fact, a large number of 
articles and reports on the funeral rituals of nomadic 
peoples of Central Asia under Russian rule have 
been preser ved. 7 On the other hand, as social 
anthropologists have acutely pointed out, funeral 
rituals also exhibit political characteristics, represented 
by the social and power relationship concerning 
the deceased.8 This article considers how both the 
Russian colonial military authority and Shabdan’s sons 
accepted and handled the death. The first half of this 
article focuses on a series of funeral ceremonies for 
Shabdan, including the mass, called āsh that was held 
half a year after the death. The latter half addresses the 
circumstances after the series of ceremonies, revealing 
the processes, by which the collaborative relationship 
between the Russian colonial military authority and 
Shabdan’s sons collapsed until the revolt of 1916.
It is necessary to first refer to the government 
system of the Russian Empire in Central Asia. The 
government structure of the Russian Empire was 
multi-layered. The peripheries of the empire, which 
were incorporated through military conquests, were 
not ruled directly by the central tsarist government, 
but by Governor-Generalships (general-gubernatorstvo) 
which were stat ioned in each per ipher y. 9 The 
Governor-Generalships were reorganized according 
to the development of military conquests. Until 
the latter half of the nineteenth century, Central 
Asia, including the Kazakh Steppe, was ruled by 
the Governor-Generalship of Orenburg and the 
Governor-Generalship of Western Siberia. The 
Governor-Generalship of Turkestan was established 
in 1867. Then, in 1882, the Governor-Generalship of 
Western Siberia was reorganized into the Governor-
Generalship of Steppes, which coexisted with the 
Governor-Generalship of Turkestan until the collapse 
of the Russian Empire in 1917. The authority of the 
Governor-Generalships was under the Ministry 
of War, and they were comprised of a few districts 
(oblast) and counties (uezd).10 From an administrative 
perspective, at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Shabdan was under the jurisdiction of the 
administrative path: Ministry of War > Governor-
Generalship of Turkestan > Semirech’e oblast > 
Pishpek uezd 11 > Tokmok uchastok > Sarïbaghïsh 
volost (MAP 1, 2). Thus, it was the army officers 
of the Russian Empire who took charge of the 
local government, including both military and civil 
administration. That is why this article names the 
local Russian authorities in Central Asia the “Russian 
colonial military authority.” 
II.  Russian Colonial Military Authority in Janāza
On 6th April 1912, Shabdan died at the age of 
73. Immediately almost all of the people in Semirech’e 
were informed with the news. According to a report 
issued in the Tatar journal, Shūrā, named “From a 
deep basin of Tian Shan Mountains” written by SabÏr 
Gabdurmanov in 1913, which described a series of 
funeral ceremonies for Shabdan, “[having known 
the news of his death] riding on horses, his retainors 
(jigits) started to spread the news in all directions. 
Until about the sunset the news arrived at all the 
towns and villages of Semirech’e, including even deep 
in the mountains”.12
After three days from his death, on 9th April 
1912, his funeral was held in Chong Kemin (MAP 2). 
Although the number of attendees differs depending 
on sources, it is certain that several thousand people 
attended the funeral.13 The point to observe in this 
chapter is how the Russian colonial military authority 
was involved in the funeral, which was called janāza in 
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the local-Islamic context.
The news of Shabdan’s death had a great impact 
on the Russian colonial military authority, which was 
clearly indicated in the fact that the news of his death 
was published in such colonial official newspapers 
as Turkestan Gazette (Turkestanskie vedomosti) and 
Semirech’e oblast Gazette (Semirechenskie oblastnye 
vedomosti).14 In addition to publishing the news in 
the colonial newspaper, the military governor of 
Semirech’e oblast M. Fol’baum instructed the Pishpek 
uezd commander to attend officially the funeral, 
considering that Shabdan had a military rank of 
Voiskovoi Starshina (Lieutenant Colonel). According to 
the instruction, the Russian colonial military authority, 
including the Pishpek uezd commander and the chief 
of the local police of Tokmok district (uchastkovyi 
pristav) with a unit of the Cossacks attended the 
funeral.15 After the funeral, Kutukov, the chief of 
the local police of Tokmok district, sent a report to 
Fol’baum as following:
A platoon of the Semirech’e Cossacks from the 
settlement of Samsonovka, attended the funeral 
under the command of the ataman Ivanov. They 
saluted to the body. And the Cossack guards 
were deployed at the gate of the tent, where the 
body was laid. When the body was taken off to 
the cemetery, the Cossacks were in a line on both 
sides of the body. In time of burial the Cossacks 
detached the military medals from the body. […] 
And they shoot blanks three times. The crowd of 
4,000 Kirgiz gathering from all over Semirech’e 
was impressed with the much respect shown for 
Shabdan by the Cossacks. Shabdan’s sons and the 
other delegates of Kirgiz asked me to convey their 
gratitude to His Excellency [i.e., Fol’baum].16
What is apparent in this extract is that the Russian 
colonial military authority organized Cossack burial 
rites and added them to the funeral, showing the 
respect to the family of the deceased. The attendance 
of the Russian colonial military authority at janāza 
had an impact on local people, as can be seen from the 
following description by SabÏr Gabdurmanov: “Besides 
various Muslims, gathering for janāza, there were 
Cossacks, Pishpek uezd commander and the chief of 
the local police.”17
When considering the Russian colonial military 
authority in the funeral, the chief of the local police 
Kutukov is worthy of attention. Chief of the local 
police was a security-administrative authority which 
was set up under the uezd commander. We can 
perceive his unique existence in the funeral, which is 
expressed in the narration of an akïn, or troubadour, 
when he recited: “In your [=Shabdan] funeral, not 
only Kirgiz, but also Russians including Kutukov 
cried with all their hearts. Oh! When Russians did 
mourning cries for Kirgiz!”18 The reason why Kutukov 
had built strong ties with Shabdan seems to be 
because he was an important collaborator in order 
to maintain the public order in the district. On this 
point, a Russian colonial officer, who worked in the 
Tokmok district pointed out as following: “To sustain 
ties with Shabdan’s family was a policy line of Kutukov 
and his predecessors since they were able to reduce 
significantly the administrative burden. […] Kutukov 
could never settle various issues within the district 
without support from the manaps.”19 In fact, such a 
collusive tie between Shabdan and Kutukov or the 
representative of the local police came out clearly in 
the funeral, which can be seen in the memorial article 
for Shabdan, published in Semirech’e oblast Gazette:
In the funeral, having read aloud a telegram 
of condolence from the military governor [i.e. 
Fol’baum], Kutukov described the role of Shabdan 
as a mediator and reminded the attendees not to 
upset the bones of the deceased [i.e. Shabdan] 
by quarreling with each other. In response to this 
all the influential figures from the Kirgiz volosts 
pledged to follow the advice of their immediate 
supervisor [i.e. Kutukov] and not to sully the 
memory of Shabdan by their conspiracies.20
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Judging from this passage, it is apparent that for 
Kutukov the funeral was an opportunity not only 
to organize a Cossack funeral on the order from 
Fol ’baum, but also to appeal the ongoing local 
governance through Shabdan’s family. After Shabdan’s 
death, Kutukov managed to keep his ties with the sons 
of Shabdan. As N.A. Gribanovskii, the police chief 
of the Pishpek city, explained, “Kutukov managed 
to inspire Kirgiz, or Kirghiz to respect and follow 
Shabdan’s family after his death.”21 In the election of 
the administrator of SarÏbaghÏsh volost, held soon after 
the funeral, in May 1912, one of his sons, Kamal was 
elected as a volost administrator with his brother Aman 
as the assistant,22 which reflected, it seems reasonable 
to suppose, the intention of Kutukov. 
III.  The Intention of Shabdan’s Sons on “Āsh”
According to adat, or local custom of Kirghiz 
and Kazakh, a memorial feast, called āsh was to be held 
after a certain decade from funeral ceremony. Āsh for 
Shabdan was held from 10th to 15th October 1912 in 
the place named Kichi Kemin (MAP 2). This chapter 
considers the intention of Shabdan’s sons regarding 
the holding of the āsh. It can be assumed that the āsh 
had two dimensions for them. The first dimension 
is to recollect the authority of late Shabdan himself. 
Another one is to appeal their influence over the local 
society by holding the āsh.
In the āsh the authority of Shabdan was unveiled 
in various ways. At the center of the venue Shabdan’s 
yurta, or the tent with his banner was delivered from 
Chong Kemin (FIGURE 1). Most of the attendees 
were Kirghiz and Kazakh.23 Having arrived at the 
venue, they set up their own tents around Shabdan’s 
tent and then they entered into the tent, crying out: 
“Our khan! Our father!”24 
FIGURE 2 is a photograph, which captured the 
inside of the tent. At the front we can see a group of 
women, who are performing koshok, or ritual crying. 
On the surface of the tent we can see the saddle 
and several jackets of Shabdan. At the front of them 
there is a dummy, dressed in the prestigious caftan 
with a shoulder loop and the gold, silver medals that 
were awarded from Tsarist government to Shabdan 
during his life. Next to those, there is a reproduction 
painting of the photograph, taken at the coronation 
of Alexander III in 1883. Entering the tent, attendee 
recited a line from Koran and performed bata, or short 
grace and presented gifts.25 
Going out of the tent attendees would see akïns 
and der vi sh , who were ce lebrat ing Shabdan’s 
achievements and qualifications, including the 
construction of mosque, his bravery, generosity, 
affection to the masses, smartness and frankness.26 In 
FIGURE 1. The tent of Shabdan with the banner 
(SOURCE: Dmitriev, S.E., “Baiga u karakirgizov po sluchayu smerti 
manapa Shabdana Dzhantaeva v Pishpekskom uezde”, Izvestiya 
Imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva, Tom 
XLVIII, Byp.VI-X (1912): appendix)
FIGURE 2. Inside the tent 
(SOURCE: Dmitriev, “Baiga u karakirgizov po sluchayu smerti 
manapa Shabdana Dzhantaeva v Pishpekskom uezde”: appendix)
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FIGURE 3. Bayge 
(SOURCE: Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv kinofotofono 
dokumentov i zvukozapisi Respubliki Kazakhstan: 2-55018)
FIGURE 4. Wrestling 
(SOURCE: Dmitriev, “Baiga u karakirgizov po sluchayu smerti 
manapa Shabdana Dzhantaeva v Pishpekskom uezde”: appendix)
FIGURE 5. S
4
āysh 
(SOURCE: Dmitriev, “Baiga u karakirgizov po sluchayu smerti 
manapa Shabdana Dzhantaeva v Pishpekskom uezde”: appendix)
In the kenesh the manaps reviewed the history of 
āsh, proposing to organize the greatest one with few 
equals in history. They estimated that its “vigorousness” 
the venue a series of games were held, including bayge, 
or horse racing, wrestling and s
4
āysh, in which two men 
riding on horses with sticks were fighting to until 
either of the two falls from his horse (FIGURE 3, 4, 
5). Thus, it can be said that the attendees of the the 
āsh recollected the authority of Shabdan as a baatïr, 
or nomadic hero through a series of games and shows 
based on the traditional value of nomads.  
On the other hand, the āsh was a test of whether 
sons of Shabdan could show off their power among 
the local community. In relation with this, we can find 
the significant passages in the article named “On the 
Kirghiz” in Shūrā: 
…after a brief interval from the death of a manap, 
a young manap holds an āsh, or memorial feast for 
his father. If his father was a famous manap, guests 
will be invited at least from two uezd. Guests 
are received cordially for three days. In the āsh a 
series of entertainments including “bayge”, “yāmba 
āt
4
ū” [to throw a silver ingot] and “s
4
āysh” are held. 
[…] From year to year it has come into fashion 
to hold āsh. It would be shameful [for manaps] 
not to hold āsh. If a manap does not hold āsh, his 
children would be insulted for his weakness and 
ignorance.27
Although the author of the article did not mention 
the reason why āsh has come into fashion among 
the manaps, it can be estimated that for manaps 
the importance of āsh as a means of showing their 
authority has increased, as they had almost lost their 
role as military commanders at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. We should consider such a point of 
view, when considering the āsh for Shabdan.       
According to SabÏr Gabdurmanov, a kenesh, or 
meeting was held for organizing the āsh for Shabdan 
on 13 June 1912 at Chong Kemin. The kenesh was 
attended not only by sons of Shabdan but also the 
other prominent manaps of SarÏbaghÏsh tribe, including 
Choko [from Esengul subdivision], Dür and Sultan 
[from TÏnay sub-division].28
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depended on the amount of the reward for the bayge, 
or horse racing, as can be seen in the following 
description of SabÏr Gabdurmanov: 
One manap said: “Why don’t we organize the 
āsh, adequate for the greatness of baatïr hajji [i.e., 
Shabdan]. I can provide five hundred heads of 
white camel”. One manap said: “On the opening 
bayge for [the āsh of ] a certain baatïr, five hundred 
heads of sheep, one hundred heads of camel, one 
hundred heads of horse and one hundred pieces of 
yāmba [were provided]”. One manap said: “For the 
opening bayge of Satay baatïr, one hundred sheets 
of cotton cloths, one hundred sheets of chapan 
[jacket] and one hundred pieces of yāmba [were 
provided].”29 
In this way the manaps recognized the authority 
of Shabdan in the traditional nomadic context of 
the amount of the reward for bayge. Following the 
discussion, they agreed that each manap would collect 
money from their own subject people.30 
However, despite the intention of sons of 
Shabdan to show that they were also such influential 
manaps as their father, on the contrary, only to expose 
their weakness at the very day of the āsh. In this respect 
it is interesting to quote from S
4
ābir ‘Abd al-Mannuf:
[in the venue of the āsh] the manaps were reluctant 
to submit own share of expenses [of the āsh they 
promised each other in the kenesh]. They haggled 
with each other, swearing: “First you must submit!” 
They managed to pocket the more amount of 
money they collected. […] As a result, the program 
of the āsh was simplified and the prize money 
was reduced. The sons of Shabdan, who wanted 
to become such a prominent manap as their own 
father, lamented the inadequateness of the āsh.31
Indeed, other manaps managed to line own pockets on 
grounds of Shabdan. In other words, this seems to be 
that the sons of Shabdan had not so much influence 
among the Kirghiz. 
IV.  Russian Colonial Military Authority in “Āsh”
This chapter deals with the analysis of the 
attitude of the Russian colonial military authorities 
toward the āsh. When considering this matter, it 
must be pointed out that Shabdan’s sons managed to 
invite even Russians to the āsh. In fact, three months 
before the āsh, they made out the “program” of the āsh, 
which was sent not only to local population, including 
Kirghiz and Kazakh, but also to Russians. Although 
the original of the program does not exist, according to 
Dmitriev, who indeed received it, it was an “ordinary 
typewritten European invitation card.”32 In addition 
to that, the announcement of the āsh was published 
in Semirech’e oblast Gazette. It was written both in 
Arabic Turk and Russian (FIGURE 6).33 It reads: 
“The traditional bayge in the mass of Shabdan Jantaev 
is to be held from October 10th to 15th this year 
(Traditsionnaya baiga, na pominki Voiskovogo starshiny 
militsii Shabdana Dzhantaeva nachnetsya s 10-go po 
15-e oktyabrya s[ego]. g[oda])”.
Considering the above, it seems that in holding 
the āsh, the sons of Shabdan kept Russians, including 
colonial officers, in their view in that they intended to 
emphasize the distinguished services of Shabdan for 
the establishment of the Russian rule in Semirech’e. 
In fact, among Russian colonial officers, there were 
those, who attended the āsh according to the invitation, 
FIGURE 6. Announcement of the āsh 
(SOURCE: “Traditsionnaya baiga,” Semirechenskie oblastnye 
vedomosti 212, 1912.)
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receiving hospitable treatment.34    
Nevertheless, the Military Governor of the 
oblast, Fol’baum never intended to attend the āsh. 
While Fol’baum gave permission to holding the āsh, 
giving instruction to the commander of Pishpek 
uezd to send Cossack troops for the maintenance of 
security,35 he never let the Russian colonial military 
authority to participate in the āsh officially. In fact, on 
the first day of the āsh, Shabdan’s sons sent a telegram 
to Fol’baum to invite the āsh, he never agreed to do 
so, only to leave on the plane of the telegram the 
decision “Not to go” (Ne poedu).36 In thinking about 
the background of such a negative attitude of Fol’baum 
to the āsh, it is suggestive to quote from the memoirs 
of M. Tynyshpaev, when he says: “after the death of 
Shabdan, in the administration of Semirech’e oblast, 
it was decided to suppress the family of Shabdan.”37 
Thus, it seems that Fol’baum had strong concern that 
his attendance at the āsh would encourage the family 
of Shabdan.  
On the other hand, in addition to declining to 
attend the āsh, Fol’baum regarded the illegal tax and 
requisition of manaps for the āsh as serious problem, 
sending to the āsh the vice military governor as a 
special official to dig up the situation.38 Although 
the special official could not prosecute the manaps, 
including sons of Shabdan,39 it seems no exaggeration 
to assume that Fol’baum tried to disturb the āsh. 
In this relation, it is interesting to refer to a series 
of anonymous reports on the āsh  published in 
Semirech’e oblast Gazette, because they did not so much 
objectively inform the situation of the āsh, but riducled 
the āsh and the sons of Shabdan, which is expressed 
best by an akïn, when he sang:
Now you [ i .e. , Shabdan] are lost . Such an 
outstanding figure as you. […] Your four sons 
are not able to accomplish any kind of enormous 
contribution that you have done and to get so 
much attention from the Russian authority. […] 
Several years before your death […] one of your 
sons [i.e., Mokush] was adjudicated guilty and was 
cast in jail for murder, which withered your vitality 
and hastened your death. Look at this! Your family 
has been living peacefully under your protection.40
Although they were anonymous reports, it is assumed 
that they no more less reflected the intension of the 
oblast government of Semirech’e, including Fol’baum. 
In other words, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
those reports can be regarded as a kind of “negative 
campaign” to prevent the sons of Shabdan to have 
influence in the local society by holding the āsh 
successfully.
Neverthrless, disarray among the Russian 
colonial military authorities in semirech’e oblast over 
how to deal with the āsh came to the surface. In fact, 
in contrast to the attitude of the oblast government, the 
chief of the local police Kutukov actively cooperated 
with the sons of Shabdan in organizing the āsh, 
especially in collecting money, as can be seen from 
the following petition of a Kirghiz, Alike Alimbekov, 
submitted to the Governor General of Turkestan in 
1913: “after the official who was sent by the military 
governor [of Semirech’e oblast], had left the āsh, the 
sons of Shabdan collected a lot of money from us, […] 
which was done by the volost administrator in witness 
of the patrol officer, Smirnov.”41 As can be seen in 
this extract, the Russian colonial military authority in 
the local level even managed to support the sons of 
Shabdan.
V.  After Āsh: Russian Colonial Military 
Authority Strengthens its Intervention
The oblast government of Semirech’e had already 
assumed the oppressive attitude toward Shabdan 
and his family even in his later years. As Tynyshpaev 
remarked in his report to the Governor General 
of Turkestan in 1916, “in 1909, on the grounds of 
partiinaya bor’ba, or the factional strife with the 
family of Shabdan, [a Kirghiz named] Sultan Dalvaev 
demanded [the oblast administration] to divide the 
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SarÏbaghÏsh volost. Despite the mixed and complicated 
land use (smeshannoe zemlepol ’zovanie), [the oblast 
administration] permitted the request.”42 Furthermore 
in 1911, when one of Shabdan’s sons, Mokush was 
arrested because of murder, the military governor of 
Semirech’e oblast Fol’baum fired the administrator of 
SarÏbaghÏsh volost, one of Shabdan’s sons Khisametdin, 
appointing as a new volost administrator a Kazakh 
from Vernyi uezd Musakhan Altispai.43 In parallel with 
the dismissal farce, the Resettlement Administration 
in Semirech’e oblast carried out to expropriate land in 
the volost, organizing two settler villages.44
With the death of Shabdan as a motivation, 
the Russian colonial military authority, including 
the oblast government, managed to strengthen its 
intervention. In practice, after the death of Shabdan, 
the Russian colonial military authority did not permit 
the inheritance of the rank of Voiskovoi Starshina, or 
the Lieutenat Colonel, expropriating the privileges 
given to Shabdan. In May 1913 the honorable caftan 
and military medals were given away to the Museum 
of the Cossack army.45 In addition to those, the 
focus for the discussion was the issue of the special 
allocation of land to Shabdan. As mentioned above, 
according to the decision of Sovet ministrov, or the 
Council of ministers, Shabdan was given “the right 
to use 400 desyatin for life.”46 Nevertheless, Shabdan 
was dissatisfied with the decision in that it was not 
allowed for his desecendants to inherit the land. Before 
half a year from his death, Shabdan sent a petition 
to Nicolas II, claiming that “heredeitary ownership 
(potomstvennoe vladenie)” of the land must be allowed.47
It was after five months from the death of 
Shabdan, or in September 1912 that the peteition 
received the answer from the Russian colonial military 
authority. The Military Governor of Semirech’e 
oblast Fol’baum with the chief of the Resettlement 
Administration in Semirech’e, S. Veretskii, announced 
the policy of permitting the inheritance under the 
condition that sons of Shabdan will agree to depart 
from SarÏbaghÏsh volost and not to participate in the 
affairs of the volost, not using the land within the 
volost and settling within the allocated land.48 To put 
it another way, the oblast government of Semireche’ 
managed to divede the family of Shabdan from 
the local community, removing their influence. In 
response, sons of Shabdan denied the suggestion, 
showing their anger, when they say: “…far from being 
a reward to the achievements of our father, such a 
measure might be equivalent of a punishment.”49 The 
Turkestan Governor-General, A.V. Samsonov, who 
had been eager to placate Shabdan himself, also had 
a different line toward his decsendants, as can be seen 
in his report to the Department of the Army General 
Staff: “…now that Shabdan was dead, his sons and 
family have no attainment deserving of the special 
allocation of the land.”50 With the agreement of the 
Department of the Army General Staff, the case was 
totally rejected,51 as a result of which the land was 
confiscated by the Resettlement Administration of 
Semirech’e, being distributed to the Russian settlers. 
On the other hand, the descendants of Shabdan never 
gave up appealing to the Russian colonial military 
authorities the restortion of the land. As far as 
confirmed in the archive documents, their last appeal 
was dated May 16th 1916, in which they complained 
bitterly of the unreasonable confiscation of the land, 
demanding for compensation on the legal grounds of 
the regulations for the resettlement policy.52
In contrast to the oppressive and negative 
attitude of the superior element of the Russian colonial 
military authority, including the oblast adoministration 
and Turkestan governor-generalship, the chief of the 
local police still continued to take not only lukewarm, 
but also even collaborative attitude toward the 
descendants of Shabdan. In this regard, it is interesting 
to refer to a case on division of SarÏbaghÏsh volost. In 
1915 a brother of Shabdan, Alagush intended to divide 
SarÏbaghÏsh volost, which was ardently supported by 
the oblast government.53 Judging from the above, it can 
be assumed that the oblast administration instigated 
Alagush to the division. To proceed the division, 
the oblast administration ordered the local police of 
Tokmok district to conduct the examination of the 
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land use of 700 kibitok, or tents of Kirghiz, who agreed 
to follow Alagush. In spite of the order from the oblast 
administration, the chief of the local police gave up the 
examination. According to the petition of Alagush, to 
prevent the division, the volost administrator, Kamal 
fooled the uezd administration by mixing the follower 
of Alagush with other Kirghiz in land use.54 Kamal’s 
tactic bearded the fruit. Indeed, on October 1915 
the assistant director of Pishpek uezd, Rimshevich, 
based on the opinion of the chief of the local police, 
reported to the oblast administration that the petition 
of Alagush could not be recognized. In response to 
this the oblast administration ordered Rimshevich 
to travel directly (not through the chief of the local 
police) to SarÏbaghïsh volost to examine the land use. 
Nevertheless, Rimshevich only repeated his previous 
opinion not to recognize the petition of Alagush. 
In the end the oblast administration was obliged to 
dismiss the case.55 
VI. Summer 1916: The Decisive Collapse of the 
Collaboration
As seen in this article, the Russian colonial 
military authority, including the oblast government 
managed to strengthen the oppressive and negative 
attitude toward the descendants of Shabdan. It must 
be reasonable to assume that the descendants of 
Shabdan felt dissatisfied with the oppressive policy of 
the Russian colonial military authority. In spite of the 
strong antipathy, they never took up arms against the 
Russian Empire. Nevertheless, in summer 1916 the 
situation became serious.
After the tsarist government suddenly issued a 
degree to mobilize into worker’s battalions inorodtsy, 
or the aliens in 25th June 1916, who had not been 
obligated to serve in the military, a great revolt 
occurred throughout Russian Central Asia. In the 
revolt of 1916 the southern part of Semirech’e oblast 
is famous for mutual massacure between Kirghiz and 
Slavic settlers under the severe land relatioship. What 
is to be expected, the descendants of Shabdan were 
obliged to be drawn into the turmoil of the revolt. 
Among them, Mokush Shabdanov was installed as a 
khan, becoming a leader of the revolt among Kirghiz 
of Semirech’e. The reason why Mokush was selected 
as the leader seems to be that he had experienced 
himself the suppression from the Russian colonial 
military authority, as can be seen in the case of his 
arrest in 1911. Gathering at the mosque of Shabdan, 
the revels, including Mokush sweared to unite for the 
revolt, distributing a manifesto over a wide area to 
rally revels in the name of “baatïr hajji,” or Shabdan.56 
What is apparent from this process is that Shabdan 
was no longer the symbol of integration into the 
Russian Empire, transforming into the symbol of 
revolt against the Russian rule. In the Islamic context, 
this process also shows the collapse of attempts of 
Shabdan and his sons at social reform through the new 
tide of Islam, or Jadidism. In addition to that, in spite 
of their modernist intention, it never spread among the 
Kirghiz mass, which seems to be a reason why the sons 
of Shandan was obliged to hold āsh according to the 
local custom of nomads.57
At the same time, it must be added that the 
sons of Shabdan were not necessarirly united over 
the attitude toward the revolt. In fact, in contrast to 
Mokush, who rose against Russia, Kamal managed 
to assume the exactly opposite attitude. As a volost 
administrator, Kamal prepared the list of workers, 
submitting it to the commander of Pishpek uezd. In 
addition to that, he and his brother Aman tried to 
control the revels including Mokush, trying to protect 
the villages of Russian settlers from the attack.58 Due 
to the lack of material, it remains uncertain how 
Kamal tried to persuade Mokush from taking arms 
against Russia. This is only a speculation, but Kamal 
must have emphasized the necessity to maintain the 
Russian rule as a base for their existence. In spite of 
the efforts of Kamal, the revels carried out attacking 
and burning the villages of Russian settlers. The levels 
left the Russian Turkestan, crossing the the Tian Shan 
Mountains to Eastern Turkestan, or Xinjiang province 
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The Russian colonial military authority could 
not avoid getting a shock to know the circumstance 
in Semirech’e. A.N. Kuropatkin, who was appointed 
as the governor-general of Turkestan in August 
1916 in order to settle the disorder, had to see the 
shocking and ironical spectacle: the sons of a former 
collaborator, Shabdan, whom Kuropatkin himself had 
supported, now rouse against the Russian Empire, 
which is clearly expressed in his letter to the War 
Minister, dated 16 August 1916:
…forty one years ago, during the conquest of 
Ferghana, Kirgiz, who are now roused into action, 
crossed over the mountains to Ferghana with their 
renowned leader Lieutenant Colonel Shabdan 
Dzhantaev, assisting Skobelev in the subjugation 
of the population that had settled there.59
The Russian colonial military authority under the 
initiative of Kuropatkin, decided to send military 
troops to subjugate the revolt. As a result of the 
operation, the mosque, which had been constructed by 
Shabdan in Chong Kemin, was destroyed and burned 
down.   
MAP 1. Russian Central Asia.
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